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Lorensen: The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence Reports in West Virginia

The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence
Reports in West Virginia
WLmAR

D. LoRNs1EN*

The ambivalent position struck with regard to the disclosure of the
presentence report to a criminal defendant in the recent changes
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dramatizes an interesting
and intense division of viewpoints.' The problem involved is simply
this: Should defendant be allowed to see and contend with a report
made to the court when the court may rest significant sentencing
decisions on the contents of the report? The typical presentence
report ranges well beyond matters that normally would rise at
trial.' It is not centrally concerned with the gravity of the
defendant's offense nor the nature of his participation in it. It is
concerned with his character, his history and environment, and
his adjustment to them. The presentence report and its influence
on the sentencing process epitomizes the fact that the humanitarian's
plea-let the punishment fit the criminal and not merely the crimehas come to be an accepted postulate of penal policy.3 There arises,
in consequence, the problem of fitting this new sophistication in
sentencing into the traditions of the adversary system of criminal
law administration.4 It is at this juncture that contending points
of view divide.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1946 were silent on
the matter of disclosing the contents of the presentence report,
save that it was made clear that the report was not be "diclosed
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University
IFEn.
R. Cmn. P. 32(c)(2), as amended (1966).
2 The federal rule states the report "shall contain any prior criminal
record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his
financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be
helpful in imposing sentence. . . ." The West Virginia Code similarly
provides: "Insofar as practicable this report shall include information
concerning the offender's court and criminal record, occupation, family background, education, habits and associations, mental and physical condition, the
names, relationship, ages and condition of those dependent upon him for
support, and such other facts as may aid the court .
W. VA. CODE, ch. 62,
art. 12, § 7 Michie 1966).
See, A en, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal,
50 J. CmM. L., C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
"Kadish, The Advocate and the Experts Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MnN. L. Ruv. 803 (1961).
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to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been
found guilty."5 The 1962 preliminary report leading up to the
recent changes in the federal practice proposed that a summary of
the presentence report be made available to the defendant and his
counsel.' This proposal was modified in 1964 to avoid the difficulties involved in the preparation of a summary and then provided
that defendant and his counsel could read the report from which
the court was specifically authorized to remove references to confidential sources 7 In the amendments to the rules that were
ultimately promulgated, all reference to an obligation to disclose the
report to defense was omitted. It was merely noted that the trial
judge "may" disclose the report. Having retreated to essentially
the same position that the rule occupied prior to amendment, the
Advisory Committee strove to salvage some trace of its innovation
by noting that the amendment makes it clear that the report may be
disclosed-which is hardly a revelation. It added the "hope" that
judges would make increasing use of the discretionary power of
disclosure.8
In the federal courts, under the old rule that was silent on the
matter of disclosure, a sizeable minority of judges regularly disclosed the contents of the reports to defense counsel.9 A similar
practice apparently prevails in New York."0 Some states have
specifically provided for disclosure by statute. In Ohio" and
Virginia,' 2 for example, the probation officer must make his report
in open court and may be examined on it.
The West Virginia Code is silent on the matter of disclosure and
even leaves the preparation of a presentence report to the discretion
of the trial judge.' 3 Since the advent of the indeterminate sentence
5

FED.

P. 32(c)(1).
R. Cmman.

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for United States
District Courts (Dec. 1962).
7. Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Second Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
States Districts Courts (March 1964).
United
8
FED. R. Caim. P. 32, as amended (1966). Advisory Committee's Note.
9 See, H-iggn Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 AiuANY L.
REv. 12 (1964); Sharp, Objectives of the Presente NCE Report, in PLoT
INsTrruTE ON SENTENCUNG, 26 F.R.D. 231, 326 (1959).
,0See Higgins, supra note 9.
"Omo
REv. CODE § 2947.06 (Anderson 1953).
'2 VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278. 1 (Michie 1957).
6

'3 W. VA.

CODE

§ 62-12-7 (Michie 1966).
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law in 1939, the sentencing choices of the judge in West Virginia
have admittedly have been quite narrow-probation or a general
sentence to the penal system are the only alternatives in most
situations. 4 Nonetheless the choice between probation and the
penitentiary is a significant one which merits careful consideration
and a presentence report may play an important role in that choice.
To gain some insight into the use of presentence reports in West
Virginia a mail questionnaire was directed to judges in this state
who are authorized to grant probation. The questionnaire was
aimed at determining the frequency of the use of the report and the
practice in regard to disclosing its contents to defense counsel.
The response to the questionnaire was surprisingly complete and
this in itself is significant. Of the thirty judges questioned twentynine responded. While the simplicity of the questionnaire avoided
the discouraging, time consuming nuisance aspects that no doubt
reduces such responses in some situations, the level of the
response was probably due as much to the intensity of interest
judges manifest in the problem of sentencing. The judges on a
whole seemed quite anxious to share information about sentencing
practices. A substantial number volunteered elaborating statements
underlining a healthy eagerness to develop a better understanding of
the practices in the state.
The responses indicate that the presentence report is used as a
basis for most sentencing decisions in West Virginia. The question
was so phrased as to limit the response about the frequency of use
to those situations where probation was in fact an available choice.
Eighteen of those responding indicated that the report was used
in "all" cases and another eight indicated it was used in "most"
cases. Only one response indicated that the presentence report was
used in only a "few" cases. Volunteered comments indicated some
interesting varieties of practice in regard to the use of these reports.
One judge noted for example that in his sparcely populated rural
circuit his personal knowledge of some defendants made the
preparation of a formal report unnecessary in some cases. Another
judge indicated a unique kind of neutral position to the report.
In this circuit the judge reported he felt obligated to direct the
preparation of such a report whenever a motion was made for
14

W. VA. CoDE § 61-11-16 (Michie 1966). See generally Brown, West

Virginia Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Laws, 59 W. VA. L.
(1957).
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probation by the defendant or his counsel. Absent such motion, the
report would normally not be prepared. This position obviously
makes the actual representation by counsel terribly important. An
unrepresented defendant could easily suffer a considerable disadvantage by being unaware of his right to seek affirmative and
informed consideration of probation. In other circuits, however,
judges indicated that the preparation of the report was automatic.
One judge expressed the opinion that sentencing could not be done
in a judicial manner without the availability of such a report.
Another suggested that the court needed all the information possible
to assist in the sentencing process and the presentence report was
simply a source of information. One judge indicated that the report
was routinely prepared in all cases even though it was obvious the
offender was ineligible for probation and the only sentencing choice
available to the court was imprisonment. The report in this
situation is forwarded to the prison officials for their use and for
the subsequent use of the Board of Probation and Parole. 5
A much greater variety of response was produced by the question
as to whether the contents of the presentence report were disclosed
to defense counsel. Eleven judges indicated that the report was
always disclosed to defense counsel: three indicated it was disclosed in most cases; nine indicated it was disclosed only rarely; and
five indicated that it was never disclosed to defense counsel. One
judge found he could not respond on the "always" to "never" scale
since no defense counsel in his circuit had ever requested an
opportunity to see such a report. With this one abstention, the
gross numbers divide evenly, fourteen judges usually disclosing the
content of the report, while fourteen judges usually do not. Six
of the eleven who indicated that the contents were always disclosed
volunteered comments in regard to their practice. A higher proportion, nine of fourteen, who regularly withhold the report volunteered
statements in regard to their practice. The judges who do not
disclose the content of the report to the defense counsel seem to feel
a bit more obligated to offer some explanation. Typically, the
explanation advanced for the practice of confidentiality is that
"sources of information would be dried up" if the contents were
15The basic statute providing for the presentence report, note 13 supra
concludes as follows: "A copy of all reports shall be filed with the board
of probation and parole." The provision apparently has never been followed
regularly.
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not held in confidence. All explanations volunteered for the practice
of confidentiality tended to rely on the "drying up" concern and
evinced a desire to protect the probation officer and his information
gathering practices.
The most interesting feature of the divided practice in West Virginia arises from the distinct urban-rural split between those circuits
which disclose the report and those which do not. Courts in more
urban areas make the report available to defense counsel. Courts in
predominately rural areas tend to hold the report confidential.
Courts in Wheeling, Parkersburg, Huntington and Charleston
routinely disclose the contents of the report. This consistent patten might indicate a difference in the kinds of information gathered
for the reports in rural areas as opposed to urban communities.
It may well be that persons in rural areas feel more closely related
on a personal basis to the defendant than in the urban areas and
thus feel more intensly a threat of embarrassment if their subjective
judgments are openly disclosed to the defendant. 6 The division
might also be explained as a manifestation of a general pattern of
more informal operation of courts in rural areas which consequently
places greater trust on persons and less trust on modes of procedure
as a primary means of assuring fair and accurate disposition in such
matters.
Arguments in regard to disclosure as opposed to confidentiality of
presentence reports have been well spelled out in the debate over
the proposed change in federal practice. Principal arguments
raised against the disclosure focus on loss of information and harm
to the defendant.' 7 There is of course the fear that sources of
information would "dry up" and the efficacy of the report would be
materially hampered. The short answer to this argument is that in
many courts the presentence reports are used effectively though
they are regularly and systematically disclosed to defense. The
courts which make a regular practice of disclosure seem not to be
hampered in any significant degree by a loss of significant information. A slightly different objection is voiced on the grounds that
persons furnishing information should be protected from embarrassment or harassment. At the harassment end of this scale we are
passim. 1965).
See, e.g., Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Must be Preserved
as a Confidential Document, 28 Far. PnoB. March 1964, p 3.
16 WE.ram, YESmiTEtAY'S PEOp.
17
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simply restating the "drying up" complaint in that a person who
fears harassment no doubt simply refuses to give any information at
all. One judge in West Virginia reported that some barn burning
reprisals had occurred in his circuit because derogatory information
given to a parole officer had eventually found its way back to the
felon concerned. It should be recognized of course that this
problem is quite different than the one of mere embarrassment at
the other end of the scale. Another West Virginia judge volunteered
the opinion that the disclosure of confidential character assessments
would tend to embarrass those who cooperated with the officer
preparing the report. This embarrassment of course is a matter of
much less gravity than the problem of actual reprisal which is no
doubt quite rare. A further objection arises from the view that there
are certain kinds of information that it would be harmful for the
defendant to see. A cold and objective evaluation by a wife or a
loved one might strip a defendant of needed emotional support at a time when it is desperately needed. 8 A final objection
that has been raised is that the disclosure of the reports might
unduly prolong the sentencing process and encourage the raising
of many collateral issues of clarifying or rectifying hearsay statements and the like.' 9 Judges who follow the practice of disclosure
seem not to find this a serious problem however and some have
indicated that disclosure helps to narrow the issues under condiseration at the time of sentencing and thus serves to make hearings concerning this matter more effective and efficient.
The argument in favor of disclosure is simple and obvious. If
the defendant is to be dealt with upon the basis of such a report,
fair play would seem to dictate that he ought to have an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the basic factual data contained in
the report and to challenge the validity of adverse conclusions
contained in it.2" Basic errors of fact are bound to occur from
time to time and the best process for identifying and correcting
these situations is disclosure and a hearing of some form which
would allow the defendant and his counsel to challenge matters
which may be misrepresented. This basic fairness argument failed
to rule the day in a due process challenge to use of such reports
18 Ibid.
'9 See Higgins, supra note 9.

20

Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Respon.sibility, 65 HAv. L.

REv. 1281, 1291-92 (1952).
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in a landmark case of Williams v. New York.' However, the experience of our day teaches that constitutional decisions are transient
and the pervasive force of constitutional due process should not be
lightly disregarded. In a recent decision, United States v. Kent,22 the
Supreme Court held that a hearing had to be afforded on demand
in a "dispositional" decision by a juvenile judge in the District of
Columbia on the matter of whether the defendant was to be
proceeded against in juvenile or criminal court.2" The Court acted
in that decision as a court of last resort for the District of Columbia
and disavowed any pretense of announcing a constitutional doctrine.
However, the not-so-subtle hint was there that the case commended
itself to the Supreme Court's attention because a denial of review
might give rise to fundamental constitutional issues. Interestingly in
that case, a "social service report", developed by juvenile authorities
and employed by a judge in making his dispositional decision transferring the defendant to the criminal court, was to be made available
to the defense counsel according to the Supreme Court's mandate.
Some form of hearing or opportunity to rebut matters in confidential reports which significantly affect important dispositional
decisions may emerge as a constitutional necessity in the not too
24
distant future.
West Virginia practice at the present time seems to reflect the
general disparity of views typical of the nationwide situation. If
we attribute any significance to the fact that the greater volume
of criminal cases probably occur in those courts which regularly
make it a practice to disclose the contents of these reports, then
West Virginia practice seems to favor the disclosure principle.
There is nothing inherent in the issue that demands an all-ornothing-at-all rule in regard to disclosure. 2' The unsuccessful preliminary drafts proposed as amendments to the federal criminal
rules suggested two ways of meeting some of the objections to
21 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see Note Due Process and Legislative Standards
of Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. 'Rv. 257 (1952).
22
2 3 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966).

D. C.

CODE §

11-1553 (Supp. V. 1966).

Compare W.

VA. CODE

§

49-

5-14 (3) (Michie 1966) which grants the juvenile court discretion to take
cases involving juveniles between 16 and 18 years of age or to remand them
to criminal courts for trial. The West Virginia provision makes no reference
to any
procedure to be employed by the court in making such a decision.
24
See, e.g., Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); United
States2 5ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1966).
Thomsen, Confidentiality of the Presentence Reports A Middle Position, 28 FED. PBo., March 1964, p. 8.
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total disclosure, viz. by summarizing or by specifically authorizing
the withholding of confidential sources. The Model Penal Code
suggests another alternative that seeks to accomodate both the
interest of a fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to rebut on
the one hand with the protections afforded the reporting system by
some measure of confidentiality on the other." West Virginia disclosure practices range from total disclosure and open court
hearing to very informal in chambers proceedings. The absence
of rigid doctrine allows an unrestricted choice of procedural techniques. If there is a trend in the legal policy in this area, it appears to
be pressing for greater disclosure and opportunity to rebut in
dispositional proceedings. It is hoped that the trial judges of the
state will use the flexibility and discretion that is at their command
to afford maximum opportunities for defendants to be alerted to the
basis on which sentencing decisions are made and to afford them
an opportunity for a fair and informed hearing.

26
MoDEL PENAL CODE: § 7.07(5) (P.O.D. 1962): "Before imposing
sentence, the Court shall advise the defendant or his counsel of the factual
contents and the conclusions of any pre-sentence investigation or psychiatric
examination and afford fair opportunity, if the defendant so requests, to controvert them. The sources of confidential information need not, however, be
disclosed." In contrast the Model Sentencing Act sponsored by the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency adopts the same position as the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-specific authority to
the trial judge to disclose or not in his discretion. Model Sentencing Act § 4,
in 9 CnmE AND DELrNQuENcY 339-69 (1963).
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